Two decades of research have established pronounced exporter productivity premia (EPP) and exporter size premia (ESP). Yet, we do not know why such exporter premia differ so widely in magnitude across countries or sectors? We take this question to the theory and to the data. We derive the theoretical sectoral EPP and ESP in a standard heterogeneous firms trade model and apply the insights from the model to detailed Danish firm-level data. We show that a significant share of the observed variation in EPP and ESP across sectors, and hence across countries, can be accounted for by sector differences in the underlying variation in productivity dispersion, variable trade costs, the ratio of fixed export costs to fixed costs of production, and the elasticity of demand.
Introduction
The existence of persistent productivity dispersion is a vivid research topic in fields ranging from macroeconomics to industrial organization. Maybe the most prominent manifestation of such productivity dispersions stems from the field of international economics, namely the stylized fact of a positive exporter premia in terms of productivity or size and sales.
1 Combined with elegant new theories (e.g. Melitz, 2003) exporter productivity premia (EPP) -as well as the closely related exporter firm size or sales premia (ESP) -have intrigued empirical and theoretical researchers in international economics for the past decades; see Greenaway and Kneller (2007) , Wagner (2007 Wagner ( , 2012 , Redding (2011) and Bernard et al. (2012) for surveys. Most recently Peter Neary et al. (2015) have been able to map fundamental theoretical conditions under which productivity and sales distributions are linked, this being of particular importance, since sales distributions are much easier to observe.
Despite the impressive volume of analyses, the central question as to the underlying drivers of the EPP and ESP magnitude remains in fact open. Albeit, as has been pointed out by, inter alia, Syverson (2011) , an understanding of the underlying drivers of such dispersion observed in the data is essential for many policy areas such as competition policy or government measures aiming at promoting productivity growth in the economy. In particular, the understanding of the EPP and ESP developed in this paper is an important stepping stone when thinking about effects and effectiveness of trade polices or export promotion policies. For example, a larger EPP makes it ceteris paribus more attractive in terms of production efficiency to design industrial policies that reallocate production resources (market shares) from non-exporters towards incumbent exporters. Viewed through this lens, the optimal industrial policies for a given sector/country (say export guarantees vs. general production subsidies) would in fact depend on the magnitude of the EPP. fixed effects EPP estimates across 89 manufacturing sectors span from -38% to 467%. Similar the export sales premia ESP estimates span from -22% to 278%.
3 On first sight, theory is silent on such differences, thus posing a challenge for the interpretation of empirical results.
To be fair, short of classifying EPP and ESP differences in magnitude simply as idiosyncratic characteristics of sectors or differences in econometric estimation strategies, a large number of renown empirical papers that report sectoral differences have addressed the issue by conducting additional investigation, for example by splitting samples and by providing plausible rationalisations; see e.g. Aw and Hwang (1995) , Aw et al. (2000) , Farinas and Martin-Marcos (2007) , Ries (2003), or Merino (2004) . Similarly, ISGEP (2008) establishes and discusses intensively the identified size differences between country EPP, and Bellone et al. (2014) report a larger EPP for Japan than for France.
4 Recently Powell and Wagner (2014) , take a look at the issue of exporter premia size differences by examining the EPP along the productivity distribution via quantile regression. The current paper takes a different direction.
We explore the link between heterogeneous firms trade theory and the empirical patterns of EPP and ESP magnitude. In doing so, the paper contributes on three frontiers. First, we provide a theoretical underpinning of why and how sectoral EPP and ESP differ as driven by sector-specific characteristics in an adapted Melitz (2003) model. Previous theoretical literature has -despite of deriving productivity rankings (and therefore also size rankings) of exporters and non-exporters -not examined the actual premia, i.e. the theoretical EPP or ESP. Second, in our empirical investigation, we construct the deep parameters pinpointed in theory and find considerable heterogeneity across industries that turn out to result in substantial differences in EPP and ESP. This demonstrates the importance and practicality of refining productivity or size distribution comparisons. For example, in our data, once the underlying industry characteristics that our theory has suggested as the drivers of EPP and ESP magnitude are taken into consideration, then 42% of the empirically observed cross-sectoral variation in TFP based EPP size differences of the data is accounted for. For the ESP the same figure is 31%.
3 EPP and ESP estimates have been obtained from industry-by-industry regressions of TFP respectively sales on an exporter status dummy conditioning on firm-specific and time-specific fixed effects (see Section 5).
4 In contrast to both these papers, much of the remaining literature on country level exporter premia are single-country studies (see the surveys of Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Wagner, 2007 Wagner, , 2012 Bernard et al., 2012; and Hayakawa et al., 2012) . In particular, the implementation of different estimation strategies makes comparisons across studies difficult.
Thirdly, the paper is able to identify new and sofar unreported empirical regularities, such as the effects from the underlying variation in productivity dispersion on the EPP and ESP, and maybe most important the role of the elasticity of demand for the magnitude of EPP and ESP. In particular, the later effect is not currently captured by the theory. Thus these findings are highly relevant for future research. In sum, our theoretical end empirical findings offer first explanations for the substantial size differences in EPP and ESP that have been reported in the literature for almost two decades.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces and calculates the sectoral EPP and ESP in a two-country symmetric multi-sector Melitz (2003) model augmented with Pareto-distributed productivities. This model links a larger sectoral EPP and ESP to a larger degree of heterogeneity in the productivity distribution of a sector, higher trade costs (both fixed and variable), and for the ESP also to a larger sectoral elasticity of demand. Section 3 presents our data and empirical set-up. Based on 18 years of firm-level data for the universe of Danish firms, we examine cross-sectional EPP and ESP estimations across 3-digit level industries with three year lags and structural estimates of the deep parameters identified in the theory. Our results are shown in section 4 and confirm -in line with theory -the role of the underlying heterogeneity in productivity and the size of fixed export costs (measured relative to domestic production fixed costs) for the ESP and EPP. Moreover, we find a negative relation between the sectoral elasticity of demand and both exporter premia, and can not identify a clear relation between variable trade costs and the EPP and ESP. Section 5 draws conclusions for future empirical research and demonstrates that a sizable share of the sectoral EPP and ESP variation found in our data can be accounted for by the underlying industry characteristics suggested by our theory. Section 6 summarizes.
Exporter Premia in Theory
Existing theoretical work provides the well known rankings of firms according to marginal productivity or size. Such a ranking implies that firms above the export threshold export and firms below do not export. While a positive sign for the EPP and ESP premia follows directly from such exercise, inference on the drivers of premia magnitude is not provided. We resolve this issue and present predictions from theory addressing the relation of the deep parameters of the model to the sectoral EPP and ESP. A simple thought experiment illustrates the task. Consider a standard heterogeneous firms trade model and add one extremely productive exporting firm. At first sight, this should increase the EPP and ESP. Yet, empirical measures of exporter premia compare the group of exporters to non-exporters. Thus, in theory, via general equilibrium effects the addition of a highly productive firm toughens the exit and exporter cut-off and therefore changes the composition of firms in both groups. Hence, it becomes a non-trivial task to compute the overall effect on the EPP and ESP.
Against this backdrop, we derive the exporter premia (EPP and ESP) in a symmetric two-country variant of Melitz (2003) . Thus we bring the model closer to what is actually examined in empirical work. In line with the literature we only consider steady states. We make two modifications to the workhorse model. First, in order to reflect cross-sectoral variation in EPP or ESP we rewrite the model to include J heterogeneous sectors. This extension is mostly a matter of exposition. Second, to ensure tractability and transparency and to obtain clear-cut analytical predictions on how the premia depend on industry-specific characteristics, we adopt the conventional assumption of productivities being Pareto-distributed.
5 Accordingly, all the well-known properties of the Melitz model are preserved in what follows.
Households
A representative household supplies L units of labour inelastically to the labour market and derives utility from consumption of different varieties from the J sectors. The utility function of the household reads
where C j denotes the consumption of the sector j specific composite consumption bundle.
6 The composite consumption bundles are of the DixitStiglitz (1977) CES type
where c j (ω) denotes consumption of variety ω of sector j, Ω j is the endogenously determined set of varieties (both domestic and foreign) from sector j available to the household and σ j is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties within sector j (equivalently the elasticity of demand). Demand for variety ω of sector j becomes
where p j (ω) is the price of variety ω of sector j and P j is the price of buying one unit of the composite bundle C j . 
Firms
All J sectors feature monopolistic competition. Accordingly, firms take the sector level variables C j and P j as given. Each firm produces one unique variety ω only within a given sector. Labour is the only input factor and remunerated at the economy wide wage rate w. Entry into a sector, i.e. inventing a new variety, is associated with sunk costs of f j,e units of labour. The creation of a new variety entails a variety-specific and fixed productivity, ϕ j (ω). Since firms within a sector only differ in terms of productivity, we omit unnecessary notation and simply refer to ϕ in the reminder of the paper. Realised variety-specific productivity is stochastic due to the random nature of research and development (R&D) processes. We assume that productivities are drawn from known sector-specific Pareto distributions with location parameters ϕ 0,j and shape parameters k j . 8 The cumulative distribution function thus reads
Firms from a competitive fringe enter the industry until expected profits from entry equal the sunk costs of entry. Firms that decide to produce face fixed costs of production f j (units of labour). Accordingly, the labour requirement of a firm with productivity ϕ that produces q units becomes l j (q| ϕ) = q ϕ +f j . In addition, firms have the option to export. Exporting is subject to fixed 7 The price index reads
8 We impose the parameter restriction k j > max(2, σ j − 1) in order to ensure finite variance of the productivity distribution and finite expected profits prior to entry. export costs of f j,x units of labour and variable export costs of the iceberg type, i.e. firms must ship τ j units for one unit to arrive.
Given the constant elasticity of demand, cf. (2), firms in each sector set prices as constant mark-ups on marginal costs implying that domestic (subscript d) and export market (subscript x) prices are given by
Sales (revenue) at home and abroad become
and total sales are
where I j,x (ϕ) is a dummy variable for export status. Accordingly, reduced form profits in the domestic market and in the export market of a sector are given by
Only firms with sufficiently high productivity find it profitable to supply a given market. Consequently, firms self-select according to productivity into exiters (ϕ < ϕ * j,d ), pure domestic non-exporters (ϕ * j,d ≤ ϕ < ϕ * j,x ) and exporters (ϕ ≥ ϕ * j,x ) where the exit thresholds, ϕ * j,d , and export thresholds of a sector (ϕ * j,x ) are defined by
We impose the parameter restriction f j,x τ σ j −1 j > f j which ensures that firms -in line with empirical evidence -partition into exporters and non-exporters.
Theoretical EPP and ESP Predictions
Within the above specification we are able to compute the sectoral EPP and ESP. In particular, we derive theoretical exporter premia measures that compare the difference in average productivity or sales (as a measure of size) between the group of exporters and the group of non-exporters relative to the average productivity or sales of the group of non-exporters. Note, that given CES consumption bundles, a sector's structure -and accordingly the sectoral EPP and ESP -only depends on parameters specific to the sector in question and not on the general equilibrium values of all B j for j = 1, 2, .., J.
The exporter premia EP j,z in sector j is defined as:
whereby z j (ϕ) = {ϕ, s j (ϕ)} determines wether we compute EPP or ESP respectively. By using the Pareto distribution (3), one can rewrite (6) as
Proof. The premia follows from evaluating (7) and (8)using the thresholds given by (4) and (5).
Proposition 1 implies a series of results on how the various sector parameteres affect the magnitude of a sector's EPP and ESP.
9
Corollary 1. Sectors that are more heterogeneous in their productivity distribution (lower k j , implying a higher productivity dispersion) have larger exporter productivity and size premia.
Corollary 2. Sectors that have higher variable trade costs (τ j ) have larger exporter productivity and size premia.
Corollary 3. Sectors that have higher fixed export costs to fixed cost of production ratio (
) have larger exporter productivity and size premia.
Corollary 4. Sectors that have larger sectoral elasticity of demand (σ j ) have a larger exporter size premia.
Corollary 5. The effect of the sectoral elasticity of demand (σ j ) on the exporter productivity premia is ambiguous.
Corollaries 1 to 4 provide clear and potentially testable predictions on the drivers of EPP and ESP magnitude. Obviously, the assumptions on the distribution functions of productivity are important for these results. To illustrate: consider the effect of fixed export costs on the premium (Corollary 3). As is well known from the Melitz (2003) model, higher fixed export costs reduce the domestic exit threshold and increase the export threshold. The lower exit threshold ceteris paribus reduces the average productivity and size among non-exporters and thus increases the premium as more low-productive pure domestic firms appear in the sector. The higher export threshold has two opposing effects. On the one hand, it increases the average productivity and size among exporters and thus the EPP and ESP should increase. On the other hand, it increases the average productivity and size among nonexporters as the least productive exporters shift status and become nonexporters, which implies a reduction in the EPP and ESP. Thus, in general no clear-cut results are to be expected unless some structure on the productivity distribution is assumed. The Pareto distribution is convenient in this respect, and we find empirical support for its applicability to our firm-level data (see Figure 1 ).
To understand Corollary 1, note that the degree of heterogeneity increases (higher productivity dispersion) when the right tail of the distribution has more mass (lower k j ). More mass in the tail in turn increases the density among highly productive large firms -both among exporters and among nonexporters. However, the effect is less pronounced for non-exporters because their productivity distribution, unlike that of exporters, is right-truncated. Hence, the EPP and EPS increases with the degree of heterogeneity.
10
While we have a clear theoretical relation between the sectoral elasticity of demand and the ESP in Corollary 4, theory does not provide a clear expected sign for the relation between the elasticity of demand and the magnitude of the EPP (Corollary 5). However, in the parameter range, where f j,x < f j , one can show that an larger σ j is associated with a larger EPP, and vice versa for f j,x > f j . (See separate appendix).
Finally, our findings on the drivers of exporter premia differences in magnitude -even though cast in a multi-sector interpretation -translate to cross-country EPP and ESP size differences. Our results suggest, that in a multi-country setting, for example, a country with a more homogeneous productivity distribution would display a lower EPP and a lower ESP compared to countries with more heterogeneity among their firms.
Comparison to Empirically Observable Measures
The productivity measure and accordingly the premium measure EP j,ϕ developed above, is in the literature following Melitz (2003) the theoretical counterpart to empirical observable productivity measures such as TFP or value-added per employee. However, as shown in Schröder and Sørensen (2012) , there is a settle difference between theoretical and empirical measures. The term ϕ from Melitz (2003) measures marginal production efficiency, and thus captures the increase in output (measured in physical units) per extra worker, i.e. a marginal productivity measure in terms of output units. Empirical measures are in contrast based on monetary values (not physical units) and include fixed costs of production, i.e. the empirically observable EPP measures include pricing decisions and are based on average costs. That is the theoretical EPP in (7) above may not be an accurate representation of the empirically observable EPP.
11 In contrast, the sales based ESP measure from above is already stated in monetary values, thus here the theory based ESP is fully in line with actual empirical ESP observations. It is instructive to briefly explore here the consequences for EP j,ϕ predictions of the above model, once they are brought in line with the empirical observable measures of productivity.
12 Let ρ denote sales per employee, thus
, where I j,x (ϕ) is our dummy variable for exporter status.
13
Although ρ j (ϕ) obviously increases in ϕ for a given export status, it is also true that ρ j (ϕ) features a discrete drop when a firm starts to export since ϕ * j,d < ϕ * j,x . The intuition behind the discontinuity is as follows: for a firm just indifferent towards exporting (i.e. zero profits from exporting) the observable productivity measure when exporting is composed from an average of home market productivity (i.e. larger than w) and foreign market productivity (i.e. exactly w), while the observable productivity when not exporting is given by its home market productivity alone (high). Such discrete jump on the firm-level is the focus of Schröder and Sørensen (2012) where it is also shown that this feature may imply that the aggregate (i.e. industry level or economy level) exporter productivity premium may in fact turn negative. For the present paper this implies, that there is no one-to-one correspondence between ρ j (ϕ) and ϕ.
Computing the theoretical industry-wide exporter productivity premium based on the revenue per employee measure ρ j (ϕ j ) we have
12 Empirical productivity measures are expresses as sales (revenue) per employee in our modified Melitz (2003) framework. This is so, since labour is the only factor of production, i.e. there are neither capital and nor intermediate inputs.
13 Note that ρ j (ϕ) = σj σj −1 w if one ignores the fixed costs.
where the exit and export threshold are derived following the steps from above. Inspection of the above expression discloses that comparative statics on EP j,ρ are rather involved, even when ϕ is Pareto distributed. However, simple numerical inspection suffice to demonstrate the following result:
Corollary 6. The relations between the empirically observable EPP measure EP j,ρ and the underlying model parameters σ j ,
, τ j and k j are nonmonotone.
Accordingly, even though the workhorse model still points at the four deep parameters considered before when asked to map the determinants that influence the size of observable exporter productivity premia in data, it offers no clear-cut expected signs. This emphasizes the relevance of the size measure ESP, which avoids this ambiguity altogether, and underlines the importance of conducting empirical investigation into the drives of the magnitude of exporter premia.
Data and Empirical Estimation Strategies
In line with the theoretical foundation outlined in Section 2, our empirical focus lies on identifying productivity and size differentials between exporters and non-exporters.
14 Here our approach is to take the theoretical model to the data in the sense that we obtain industry-level structural estimates of the parameters shown in Section 2 to theoretically affect EPP and ESP. We include these parameters as interaction terms in simple firm-fixed effects models for log sales and two different productivity measures. The core of the analyse then examines how the empirically observed EPP and ESP correlate with the estimated sector-level structural parameters and compare results to the theoretical predictions. Wagner (2007 Wagner ( , 2012 provides comprehensive surveys of the empirical literature and finds almost universal support for the view that the positive EPP found in the literature are caused by the most productive firms self-selecting into export markets (for other recent studies see e.g., López, 2009; Kneller and Pisu, 2010; Vinzenzo and Wagner, 2011) . In the same spirit, Bernard et al. (2007, p. 111) argue that: "Results from virtually every study across industries and countries confirm that high productivity precedes entry into export markets". At the same time, there is some empirical support for the hypothesis that firms become more productive as a consequence of exporting (see e.g., De Loecker, 2007; Kneller and Pisu, 2010; Marin and Voigtländer, 2013) . Of course the two hypotheses, self-selection and learning through exports, are not mutually exclusive. Accordingly, we employ a lag structure regressing three year lagged size and productivity on contemporaneous exporter status in order to focus -in line with the theory employed -on selection into exporting.
Data
Our data set consists of Danish firm-level data provided by Statistics Denmark for the period 1995-2012 and combines destination-specific export information (dating back to 1992) with business account information. Starting from the universe of all Danish firms, we exclude non-manufacturing firms and firms with missing sales or total sales below DKK 100,000 (about USD 17,000) per year. Furthermore, we require that firms at least have one employee. Thus, we only exclude extremely small if not erroneous firms but abstain from trimming the sample with respect to output, productivity or other firm characteristics. This allows us to maintain information on essentially all active manufacturing firms. A firm is classified as an exporter if it exports for at least three successive periods. Accordingly, we have to exclude firms with less than three successive observation periods (between 1992 and 2012) from the analysis to prevent left truncation in the export status coding. The resulting sample is composed of 22092 firms, of which 6018 at some point between 1995 and 2012 are classified as exporters. The central variables capital and labour are measured as firms' total fixed assets and as firms' number of full-time equivalent employees, respectively. Descriptive statistics on all relevant variables are provided in Table 1 . Sectoral information is calculated at the 3-digit level, arriving at 89 sectors over 18 years with active exporters to compare and analyse sectoral EPP differences across.
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To access how closely the productivity distribution for Denmark resembles a Pareto distribution, we transform Equation (3) into logs and obtain a convenient linear regression model that allows us to evaluate the goodness of fit of the Pareto distribution:
with G j (ϕ ijt ) denoting the empirical distribution function of productivity in 15 During the sample period the industry classification scheme changed from NACE 1.1 to NACE 2.0. We use overlapping information for both classification schemes for the years 2000-2008 to define firms' industry at the three-digit NACE 2.0 scheme. industry j, i denoting firm and t time. 16 If productivity indeed follows a Pareto distribution, the depicted log-log relationship should follow a linear function. As found in previous literature, a linear function is not a good fit when considering all firms. However, when ordering firms according to their productivity and subsequently excluding the bottom 5th, 10th and 25th percentile, the linear fit between ln(1 − G(ϕ)) and ln ϕ improves dramatically. Thus the right tail of the actual productivity distribution has the best match to the Pareto.
Empirical Model
As always when taking theory to the data, it is important to acknowledge the wide range of forces that affect real countries and firms' trading patterns, but that have been conveniently ignored in the theoretical set-up. For example, alternative drivers of trade, such as comparative advantage or effects stemming from other country asymmetries, are all absent in our theoretical results, but will matter in the data. Similarly, as shown in section 2.4 above the empirically measures of productivity depart from the theoretical marginal productivity concept of our core model. Also, as Eaton et al. (2012) have pointed out recently, the conventional modelling of firms as points on a continuum creates additional -potentially costly -discrepancies between theory and data. In addition, in reality labour is not the only factor of production and firms will often not be single product firms. Furthermore, firm capital and purchased materials are relevant and unobserved firm idiosyncrasies may also affect firms production technology and need to be accounted for. Finally, time and timing -an illusive concept when studying steady state equilibria as in Section 2 -will clearly be present in our firm-level data. While staying true to the theoretical model our empirical analysis has to account for these realities.
Our baseline model reads:
where Z it−3 either is total sales of firm i at time t−3 or its labour productivity
with Y denoting value added and Lab full time equivalent workforce. To assess the exporter premium in terms of total factor productivity (TFP), i.e. to allow for capital as an additional production factor, we estimate the following model:
with Cap representing firm capital measured as fixed assets.
17
Our main variable of interest, exporter status, is represented by the dummy variable Exp it while V jt represents industry j specific characteristics as outlined in Section 2, for example the degree of heterogeneity in productivity among the firms in the industry with i ∈ j. The parameter α i refers to a firm-specific fixed effect controlling for firm idiosyncrasies that may determine our outcome of interest while being correlated with, e.g., exporter status or industry characteristics V jt . Thus, the exporter premium is identified through longitudinal within-firm variation. The error term ijt is allowed to be heteroscedastic and correlated within 3-digit industries j.
Based on the parameter estimates obtained from estimating Equations 12 and 13 we quantify the relative size and productivity differences between exporters and non-exporters in per cent, i.e. estimate the exporter premium EP according to:
In order to embed Corollaries 1 to 6, we obtain structural estimates of industry characteristics V jt by computing moments from the model in Section 2 and equating these moments to their empirical counterparts. The degree of heterogeneity in the productivity distribution is measured by the industries standard deviation of log labour productivity. This is a standard measure of productivity dispersion (see e.g. Bernard et al., 2003) and in our theoretical model this measure reads
Accordingly, the relation between the productivity dispersion and the empirical ESP and EPP is comparable to Corollary 1 and one would expect 17 Alternatively one could obtain TFP estimates as a residual from production function estimation in a fist stage and assess TFP determinants in a second stage. Both methods typically are not equivalent, unless exporter status and firm workforce and capital are orthogonal (Frisch and Waugh, 1933; Lovell, 1963) . Our one stage approach identifies the coefficient on export status conditional on any correlation with the production factors. Accordingly, modeling the determinants of TFP in one stage is more conservative as the correlation with production factors is partialled out.
18 Our derivations of this and the other moments below are elaborated further in a separate appendix, available upon request.
sectors with a higher degree of heterogeneity in productivity to command larger EPP and larger ESP.
Next, we move to Corollaries 2 to 5. In contrast to our measure of k jt , directly observable empirical measures corresponding to σ jt , f jt,x f jt , and τ jt are somewhat less straightforward to obtain.
For the elasticity of substitution σ jt we utilise that the coefficient of variation for sales of domestic firms on the domestic market in according to the model reads
and given the estimate of k jt and the empirical coefficient of variation we obtain an estimate of σ jt . Next we turn to the ratio of fixed export costs to fixed costs in the domestic market. We have to be slightly careful as we have a two-country theoretical model whereas in the data the Danish firms export to several countries with different export barriers. For our purpose the important division of firms is between exporters and non-exporters and by making the crude assumption that all firms in all industries enter the same export destination first, we can exploit the performance of Danish firms on that destination to estimate the trade barriers relevant for becoming an exporter or not. The European Union (EU) is the most obvious market for Danish exporters as are Norway and Greenland -together these markets account for about 64 percent of all Danish exports. We thus aggregate the EU, Norway, and Greenland as the first export destination. 19 We compute the ratio of the average sales in the domestic market across all firms,s jt,d , and the average sales in the EU market,s EU jt,x (nearest export market for Danish firms, cf. above) for the group of firms exporting to that market and obtain from the model
According to Corollary 3 we expect that the size and productivity differential between exporters and non-exporters increases in the ratio of fixed export costs to fixed domestic costs follows from the empirical share of firms exporting to the EU. According to Corollary 2 higher variable trade costs should result in larger EPP. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the obtained deep parameters. 
Results
In what follows we focus on how ESP and EPP vary with the structural estimates of industry characteristics obtained in Equations (15)- (18). As a benchmark we first estimate variants of Equations 12 and 13 ignoring industry-and firm-level unobserved heterogeneity and constraining structural estimates of industry characteristics (our deep parameters) to remain constant at their 1995 value. This exercise is very close to our theoretical setting in that we, for the moment, ignore systematic selection of firms into specific industries and identify the impact of industry characteristics on ESP and EPP through pure cross sectional variation. We then contrast these findings with the more comprehensive modeling approach laid out in Section 3 allowing for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity and the associated selection into exporter status and specific industries.
To save space we only report the estimated ESP and EPP in Tables 3  and 4 but do not report the 24 underlying econometric estimations. According to Equation (14), ESP and EPP are allowed to differ along 3-digit industry characteristics V jt . For this reason we estimate the premia at the mean, the bottom decile, the median, and the top decile of the respective estimate of industry characteristic V jt and perform a Wald test on the H 0 that, respectively, the ESP and EPP for the top and bottom decile are equal.
First, taking into consideration the very simple purely cross sectional model (Table 3 ) and focussing on the structural estimate regarding industrylevel productivity heterogeneity k −1 , we find the pattern predicted by Corollary 1 with respect to sales. Albeit ESP are considerably smaller this pattern continues to hold when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity as reported in Panel (1) of Table 4 .
20 According to this model specification, in industries where firms are most homogeneous in terms of productivity, exporting firms on average have 11% higher sales than non-exporting firms. In contrast, in the industries with the highest productivity heterogeneity exporter status is associated with 24% higher sales.
In terms of labour productivity and total factor productivity a very similar pattern emerges, most robustly, however, when looking at total factor productivity. Exporting firms in industries that are most heterogeneous (the top decile of k −1 ) on average have substantially higher EPP than firms in industries that a very homogenous. When controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. allowing for the systematic selection of heterogenous firms into specific industries and into exporter status, this pattern, however, is statistically significant only in terms of total factor productivity. Accordingly, firms in industries at the bottom decile of k −1 are associated with a 8 percent EPP compared to a 15 per cent EPP for firms at the top decile of k −1 . Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, the 5%, the 1% levels, respectively. Underlying models with three year lagged sales, labour productivity, value added in logs as dependent variables.
Second, we consider variable trade costs τ . Our findings indicate that ESP and EPP are mostly negatively affected by industry-level average τ or not affected at all thereby contradicting Corollary 2. The negative relationship is most pronounced when controlling for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. when controlling for the selection of heterogenous firms into specific industries. As reported in Table 4 , firms in the bottom decile of τ are associated with an ESP of 21 per cent whereas this sales premium drops to 12 per cent in industries with very large variable trade costs, i.e. industries in the top decile of τ . Similarly, EPP in terms of total factor productivity vary between 14 per cent in the bottom decile of τ and 8 per cent in the top decile of τ . EPP in terms of labour productivity follow a similar pattern. However, as indicated by the Wald test reported in Table 4 the difference in EPP between the bottom and top decile are rendered insignificant.
Third, we consider relative fixed export costs fx f
. Firms in the bottom decile of fx f on average are associated with lower ESP and EPP than firms in industries with very high relative fixed export costs, i.e., the top decile of fx f . Again, this pattern is most pronounced after controlling for heterogenous firms' selection into exporter status and specific industries. As reported in Table 4 exporting firms in the bottom decile of fx f show 11 per cent higher sales than non-exporters whereas this ESP increases to 26 per cent for firms in the top decile. Similarly, EPP in terms of labour productivity range between 2 per cent in the bottom decile of fx f and 6 per cent in the top decile. EPP in terms of total factor productivity range between 6 and 18 per cent comparing industries in the bottom and top decile of fx f . Thus, our findings lend strong empirical support to Corollary 3 from the theoretical model. Fourth, we regard differentials between exporter and non-exporters subject to industry-specific structural estimates of the elasticity of demand σ. Corollary 4 had a clear prediction for the ESP, while corollary 5 -dealing with the EPP -had an ambiguous prediction. Our empirical results strongly go against Corollary 4. Irrespective of whether or not we control for unobserved firm heterogeneity ESP are found to fall in σ. As reported in Table 4 , the Table corresponding to a model specification accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, exporting firms in the bottom decile σ on average have 23 per cent higher sales than non-exporters while dropping to 10 per cent for firms in the top decile of σ.
Moreover, we find that although effects theoretically are ambiguous, with our data EPP generally fall in σ. When controlling for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity total factor productivity of exporting firms in the bottom decile of σ is 14 per cent higher than that of non-exporting firms while EPP drop to 9 per cent in the top decile of σ. This pattern is strongly statistically sig-nificant. For EPP in terms of labour productivity, however, we only observe a much less pronounced and statistically insignificant difference between the bottom and top decile of σ, at least once we control for heterogenous firms selection into exporting status and specific industries.
Summarizing, we find empirical support for Corollaries 1 and 3 which is robust to controlling for firm heterogeneity. Accordingly, ESP and EPP significantly rise in industry-level productivity heterogeneity k −1 and relative fixed export costs fx f . Furthermore, our empirical results profoundly challenge the positive relation between ESP and EPP and variable trade costs proposed in Corollary 2. If anything, ESP and EPP decrease in τ . Finally, we find empirical support for a negative relation between ESP and EPP and the industry-specific elasticity of demand. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, the 5%, the 1% levels, respectively. Underlying models with three year lagged sales, labour productivity, value added in logs as dependent variables, firm fixed effects and time dummies.
Implications for Empirical Research
It is worth to explicitly state that the essential issue in the paper is not to show how to avoid bias when estimating ESP or EPP. Industry-specific and for that matter country-specific exporter premia can be estimated without conditioning on industry-or country-specific characteristics, respectively. One could even argue that including controls for all industry-specific characteristics (e.g., by including industry-time-specific constants) would result in an over-specified model understating true exporter premia that according to our theory exactly depend on some of these characteristics. However, the important issue is that our results show that when it comes to solving the puzzle of why exporter premia differ so widely across industries and countries, one has to take into account the different industry-characteristics derived from the theory and corresponding industry-structures of countries. As such, our paper has identified four relevant parameters that drive the magnitude of observed premia, the central candidates being: industry-level productivity heterogeneity, variable trade costs, relative fixed costs of exporting and last but not least the sectoral elasticity of demand. Obviously, this in turn implies that the origins for sector (or country) differences in these characteristics are important future alleys for empirical research. In particular, on the persistence of productive differences Syverson (2011) draws up an comprehensive overview of existing results and directions for future research. In order to demonstrate how much of the cross-industry variation in exporter premia, that we see in the data, can be explained by the different industry characteristics that we have identified, we in what follows carry out a simple purely descriptive exercise. Instead of explicitly modeling the interaction of ESP and EPP with our four deep parameters we now, in a firsts step, obtain average sectoral-level ESP j and EP P j (one for each j of our 89 three-digit industries) by estimating models similar to Equations 12 and 13 sector by sector without interaction terms. Our 89 sectoral-level ESP and EPP are thus conditional on firm-level unobserved heterogeneity, year-and industry-specific shocks and focus on the selection into exporting by lagging the dependent variables (sales and productivity) by three years respectively. In a second step we now regress sectoral average ESP j and EP P j on the 1995 values of all industry-level deep parameters V j,1995 . The corresponding R 2 s will reflect how much of the total variation in ESP and EPP can be explained by the deep parameters suggested by theory and are reported in Table 5 . The approach merely constitutes a back of the envelop calculation as, different from the models estimated in Section 3, it does not correct for the systematic selection of heterogenous firms into industries with specific characteristics, say a low productivity heterogeneity or high relative export costs. However, from the exercise we may cautiously conclude that about 31 per cent of the cross industry variation in ESP stem from cross industry differences in the four deep parameters identified in the theory. For EPP the respective figure is with 42 per cent even higher. We thus conclude that a sizable share of the observed variation of ESP and EPP across industries can be explained by cross industry differences of four profound industry characteristics. Observations 89 89 89
Conclusion
Exporter premia are a central stylised fact of international economics, albeit the accumulated empirical evidence discloses substantial -and so far unexplained -EPP and ESP size differences between countries and across sectors within countries. The present paper tackles this issue both theoretically and empirically. First, we ask if at all -and in what direction -the workhorse model of heterogeneous firms trade (i.e. Melitz, 2003) contains predictions on the determinants of the magnitude of exporter premia. In particular, we introduce explicit EPP and ESP measures into a version of the Melitz (2003) model. This model gives a number of new insights and predictions. However, we also pinpoint a subtle difference between the marginal productivity of the theory and empirical representations of productivity. More precisely, we show that empirical measures of productivity will -when implemented in the theoretical model -give ambiguous model predictions, an issue that is avoided when we turn to ESP based on sales. Second, we compare the theory to evidence derived from Danish firm-level data. We are able to identify an important role for the degree of heterogeneity in productivity in explaining the variance in EPP and ESP magnitude. Both theoretically and empirically, industries where the realised productivity distribution displays a wider variance feature larger EPP and ESP. Similar, both the theory and the empirical results link larger relative fixed export costs to larger exporter premia. Moreover, while in theory the sectoral elasticity of demand has ambiguous effects on the magnitude of the EPP and a positive correlation with the ESP, we find strong empirical patterns that sectors with lower elasticity of demand command larger EPP and larger ESP. Our results contribute several directions for future research. In terms of theoretical extensions, for example, the relation between the elasticity of demand and the EPP and ESP found in our data should ideally, if confirmed by other empirical studies, feature in the models of international trade. Similarly, the link between fixed export costs (which matter in the policy debate surrounding trade facilitation) and the EPP and ESP should be further investigated. In particular, the prevalence of sizable exporter productivity and sales premia has sparked renewed interest in policies that assist the international activity of firms. In terms of the economies or sectors overall production efficiency, a larger exporter productivity premium makes it, everything else equal, more attractive target industrial policies that reallocate production resources (market shares) from non-exporters towards incumbent exporters. Thus optimal industrial policies (e.g. export guarantees vs. general production subsidies) may well depend on the magnitude of the exporter productivity premium. Our paper has show how the size of these premia in turn depends on a limited number of deep parameters. Moreover, our paper also shows that certain policies, say export promotion programmes that constitute reductions in fixed export costs, will at least in theory reduce exporter premia. Exploring the links between optimal policy design and industry observables, such as exporter premia, is an important topic for future research.
Most importantly, our findings put new perspective on the sizable empirical literature on exporter premia. We highlight three directions in which the present paper contributes. Firstly, this paper illustrates theoretically a concern raised in the empirical literature (e.g. Syverson, 2011) , namely that the link between theoretical exporter premia and empirical manifestations is best covered by considering productivity premia as well as size or sales premia. In particular, our model shows that empirically feasible measures of the EPP when implemented in a heterogenous firms trade model give ambiguous predictions, an issue not present when formulating, for example, the exporter size premium via sales in such theoretical framework. Secondly, we are able to identify central fundamentals that matter for differences in exporter premia. We establish that the variance in the underlying productivity distribution, the relative size of fixed export costs and the sectoral elasticity of demand are decisive fundamentals for EPP and ESP realisations. These findings, if supported by other empirical studies, are worthy candidates for future stylised facts. Thirdly, our analysis suggests that the cross-country variation in exporter premia that is well established in the literature can at least partly be explained by cross-country differences in industry structure and industry characteristics. Namely, that estimates of the EPP and ESP will differ across industries and countries due to market or sector specific and measurable variations in the underlying productivity dispersion, relative fixed export costs or differences in the elasticity of demand.
